COMMENT
PRIVACY AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
NEW TEST, NEW BENEFICIARIES
INTRODUCTION

The litigant who wishes to vindicate his right to privacy has
traditionally been required to "make a far more persuasive showing . . . in order to defeat a defense motion for summary judgment" than plaintiffs in other civil actions.' The rationale is that
even an unsuccessful suit might obstruct free expression. The
Supreme Court has declared that the very possibility of a publisher's erroneously suffering a substantial judgment "would create a
strong impetus toward self-censorship, which the First Amendment
cannot tolerate. ' 2 Thus, for the most part, trials in first amendment cases have been discouraged.
Recent developments in federal courts are evidence of some
inclination to change this. In Taggart v. Wadleigh-Maurice, Ltd.,4
Thomas Taggart, a worker who was filmed while cleaning latrines
See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971).
The court in Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), has indicated
that in cases involving claims of libel or invasion of privacy which are brought against
publications dealing with matters of interest to the public, "[s]ummary judgment is particularly appropriate." Protection of the constitutional privilege of free expression demands
"summary relief to defendants in order to avoid the 'chilling effect' on freedom of speech
and press." Id. See also Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
4 489 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 937 (1974).
Taggart sought damages and injunctive relief pursuant to section 51 of the New York
privacy statutes. See 489 F.2d at 437. N.Y. Civ. RiGHTs Law § 50 (McKinney 1948) reads as
follows:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having
first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent
or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The law further provides:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first
obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court
of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or
picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use ....
Id. § 51. For cases dealing with New York's privacy statutes see Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); La Forge v. Fairchild Pub., Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 636,
257 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1965); Selsman v. Universal Photo Books, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 151, 238
N.Y.S.2d 686 (1963).
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at the Woodstock Festival and had subsequently brought an action
in the district court charging that "he [had] suffered mental anguish, embarrassment, public ridicule, and invasion of his right to
privacy," 5 appealed from a grant of summary judgment.6 A twominute segment of a documentary about the Festival depicted
Taggart performing his duties while agents of the defendant movie
company engaged him in conversation. 7 The sequence was greeted
with considerable critical acclaim.8 In reversing the district court's
decision, the Third Circuit held that the record presented issues of
5 489 F.2d at 437.

6 Id. at 435-37.
IId. at 435-36. The circumstances in which he was photographed were indicated in the
deposition as follows:
"Q. Basically, at the time you were at Woodstock and you were approached by
these two men, had you ever seen them before?
A. No, I never did.
Q. How did they engage you in conversation?
A. Well ...as I was working these two men just came up and started talking to
me. What are you doing there, I think was the key sentence. What are you doing
there, they said.
Q. You responded to the conversation that ensued?
A. Yes. From there on, I went on about my business, about doing my work. As
I was, they spoke to me and asked me what was this, and so forth.
Q. Did you respond to anything they asked you?
A. I responded to the questions they asked me.
Q. You mentioned before that they had cameras. How big were the cameras
they had? Can you show us?
A. They looked like the little square box or something like that.
MR. FARLEY: Indicating about six inches long.
,A. Maybe rectangular.

Q. So the cameras were like home movie type cameras?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you see any of those large cameras that they used to depict when they
show the news?
A. No. Whatever it was they had was strapped. They had them in a strap on
their neck.
Q. In the general vicinity through these days you were at the festival, were
there many people with cameras of various types?
A. As I recall, I saw different types of cameras. ...
Q. At any time did anyone ask your permission to take the picture?
A. Well, not that they asked me. Nobody came up to me and said, can I take
your picture, nothing like that. They just came up and started talking. As they were
talkingQ. Was one talking to you and the other took the picture?
A. It was a combination ...
Q. In relation to the two men taking your picture did you know that they were
taking it for any public released [sic]?
A. No. I had no idea of that."
Id.at 436.
8 Id. at 437.
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fact which should have been developed in a jury trial. 9 Since the
evidence revealed that Taggart may have been "drawn out and
made an involuntary performer," there existed a question of fact
as to whether he stood in the position of a participant in a newsworthy event.'"
In a decision that closely followed Taggart, the "drawing out"
test was applied to substantially different facts in Grant v. Esquire,
Inc. 1 Cary Grant brought an action for libel and invasion of privacy when his photograph appeared on the torso of a model in
connection with an article on clothing styles. 12 The model presumably received a fee for his trouble. Grant received nothing. In
denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court
logically extended the "drawing out" test to prevent Esquire from
"appropriat[ing] his services as a professional model."'13 The question for the jury was whether Grant's picture was used for pur14
poses of trade.
One can only appreciate the significance of these recent developments in the interplay between the first amendment freedoms
and the right to privacy in the context of the history of that right.
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

While there has been much discussion of the right to privacy
as a philosophical concept,' 5 it was introduced as a legal concept in
9 Id. at 438.
10 Id. The court concluded:
We can affirm the grant of summary judgment on such a record only if we are
prepared to hold that as a matter of law the defendants are entitled to judgment
even if Taggart was deliberately drawn out as a performer in a commercial film.
Such a ruling would leave very little to § 51 or to any similar statutory or common
law right of privacy. It would be predicated upon a more absolutist interpretation
of the first amendment than has yet been espoused by a majority of the Supreme
Court. But more important, such a ruling, if it is to be made, should be made on a
record in which the facts have been fully developed. Only with such a record can
the necessary balance between the conflicting rights of personal privacy and of
freedom of expression properly be struck.
Id.
For a discussion of the "newsworthiness" doctrine see notes 71-77 infra and accompanying text.
"1 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
12 Id. at 877-78.
Grant's claim, like Taggart's, was based in part on section 51 of the New York Civil
Rights Law. Id. at 878. The text of that statute is set out in note 4 supra.
Grant also claimed that the defendant's action had given rise to a cause of action in libel.
The court dismissed this contention, stating that the photograph could not have conceivably
had an effect on Grant's reputation. Such an effect is a necessary element of libel under New
York law. 367 F. Supp. at 878.
13 Id. at 878, 884.
14 Id. at 880-81.

"S For a discussion of the Lockean basis for early American theories of privacy see A.
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an article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890.16
Concerned with the mental distress resulting from unwelcome publicity and intrusion into private affairs, 1 7 the authors defined the
right to privacy as "the right to be let alone.""' They indicated that
this right had actually existed for many years under the law of
property, contract, trust and confidence,' 9 but that it was necessary
to enforce the right to privacy on its own.20
Since the pivotal Warren-Brandeis work, a plethora of articles
have appeared which have further attempted to define and describe this right. 2 ' The first case of significance which tested the
WESTIN,

PRIVACY AND FREEDOM

330-64 (1967).

Privacy, in the context of a republican

political system of the 1790's, was defined in terms of individualism, limited government,
and private property. The purpose of each, according to Westin, was to protect citizens from
government surveillance. Id. at 330.
JO

See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).

7 This concern was a personal one for Mr. Warren, for the unwelcome publicity he
attacked was often used against him. As members of "blue blood" society, his actions and
those of his family were constantly being reported in the newspapers. After the particularly
annoying reports of the wedding of his daughter, he collaborated with his law partner, Louis
D. Brandeis, on the article concerning the right to privacy. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383 (1960).

1s Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 193. See also T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS § 101,
at 192 (student ed. 1907).
'1 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 200-11. These laws, according to the authors,
may have satisfied the demands of society at one time,
but since the latest advances in photographic art have rendered it possible to take
pictures surreptitiously, the doctrines of contract and of trust are inadequate to
support the required protection, and the law of tort must be resorted to. The right
of property in its widest sense, including all possession, including all rights and
privileges, and hence embracing the right to an inviolate personality, affords alone
that broad basis upon which the protection which the individual demands can be
rested.
Id. at 211.
20 id. at 213-14. From its inception, the authors were aware of certain limitations on
privacy. They noted that the right would not prohibit any publication of general interest to
the public, and the right would cease upon publication with the individual's consent. Id. at
214-16, 218. They recognized, however, that truth Would not afford a defense and neither
would the absence of malice. Id. at 218.
21 One group of articles has expanded on the significance of the right. See, e.g.,
Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974); Davis, What Do We Mean By "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L. REv. 1
(1959); Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 713 (1948);
Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932); Kacedan, The Right of Privacy (pts. 1
& 2), 12 B.U.L. REv. 353, 600 (1932); Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REv. 693
(1912); Ludwig, "Peaceof Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REV. 734
(1948); Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MicH. L. REV. 526 (1941); Ragland, The Right of
Privacy, 17 Ky. L.J. 85 (1929); Yankwich, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope and
Limitations, 27 NOTRE DAME LAw. 499 (1952).
Other commentators have disagreed with the terms and importance of the right. See,
e.g., Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 326 (1966); Lisle, The Right of Privacy (A Contra View), 19 Ky. L.J. 137 (1931); Lusky,
Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 693 (1972).
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viability of privacy as a legal concept was Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co. 22 The Court of Appeals of New York, in determining whether a picture of a young woman could be used to advertise
flour without her consent, rejected the Warren-Brandeis proposition, holding instead that a right to privacy did not exist and that
the plaintiff was entitled to no relief. 23 This position was rejected
three years later when the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the
use of the plaintiff's name and picture without consent for advertising purposes invaded his right to privacy, in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.2 4 The court even predicted that at some
point "the American bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever
entertained by judges of eminence and ability. "25
Thus, the right to privacy has been interpreted as prohibiting
the use of one's name or picture in advertisements without consent.
However, it was early established that when an individual becomes
involved in a newsworthy event, 26 such as an accident 27 or a
crime, 2 or is a public figure, 29 he loses that right. It is this concept
of "newsworthiness," representing an interplay between the first
amendment freedoms of speech and press and the right to pri,22

171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).

23 Id. at 542, 556, 64 N.E. at 442, 447-48. This decision, due to the storm of disapproval

which it generated, led to the enactment of the New York privacy statutes in 1903. See
Prosser, supra note 17, at 385. For a history of New York privacy law see S. HOFSTADTER,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN NEW YORK (1954).
24 122 Ga. 190, 217, 50 S.E. 68, 79 (1905).
25 Id. at 220, 50 S.E. at 81.
2 For a discussion of the "newsworthiness" doctrine see notes 71-77 infra and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Kelly v. Post Pub. Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951).
" See, e.g., Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929). Plaintiff and
her husband were attacked by two men who stabbed her husband to death. During the
struggle, plaintiff fought fiercely to protect her husband but was unable to subdue the
attackers. The next day, in a story about the incident, the newspaper quoted plaintiff as
saying: "'I would have killed them. I tried.... 1 will revenge him someday.' "Id. at 227-28,
18 S.W.2d at 972-73. The Kentucky court of appeals, however, held that although one has
the right to be let alone, when an individual,
willing or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public interest, he emerges from
his seclusion, and it is not an invasion of his right of privacy to publish his photograph with an account of such occurrence.
Id. at 229, 18 S.W.2d at 973.
29 See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). Plaintiff, a child
prodigy, had at the age of eleven years addressed an audience of college professors and
students in mathematics. Having attempted to avoid publicity throughout his life, he was
discovered 30 years later by a reporter who published a story describing plaintiffs job as a
clerk in a business house and relating his habit of collecting streetcar transfers. Id. at 807.
Plaintiff brought an action for invasion of privacy, but the court held that the public's
interest in obtaining information becomes dominant over the individual's desire for privacy,
and his claim was denied. Id. at 809.
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vacy, 30 that has proved to be the most viable defense to privacy
31
actions.
Although an authentically "newsworthy" figure may forfeit his
right to privacy, an individual who is singled out from the public
with an undue focus of attention may claim that an actionable
invasion of privacy has resulted.3 2 This may occur where the event
depicted is not a newsworthy one and the facts reported only
concern their subject's private life. The leading case in the development of the law of privacy dealing with the public disclosure
of private facts is Melvin v. Reid. 3 Plaintiff, a former prostitute who
had been tried and acquitted for murder and who had since been
married and was living a "respectable life," recovered a judgment
from a movie producer who made a motion picture depicting the
true story of her life seven years after the trial.3 4 Although the
court refrained from using the term "right to privacy" as a basis for
plaintiffs action, it held that a person has a constitutional right to
35
be free from an invasion into his or her private life.
30 At an early point in its development the right to privacy collided with the first
amendment guaranty of freedom of the press. What "result[ed] was the slow evolution of a
compromise between the two." Prosser, supra note 17, at 410. Much of the legal controversy
over privacy has been involved with this compromise. For a discussion of the evolution of
"news" as it relates to public interest and public figures see id. at 410-15.
SI See notes 54-57 infra and accompanying text.
32 In Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y.S. 800 (1932),
aff'd mem., 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 713 (1933), the court held that since defendants had used
motion pictures of the plaintiff without her consent for trade purposes, plaintiff was entitled
to relief under New York's privacy statute. 235 App. Div. at 571, 257 N.Y.S. at 800-01.
11 112 Cal. App. 285, 297'P . 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
14 Id. at 286-87, 292, 297 P. at 91, 93-94.
15 Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93-94. The court explained its decision by stating:
We believe that the publication by respondents of the unsavory incidents in the
past life of appellant after she had reformed, coupled with her true name, was not
justified by any standard of morals or ethics known to us and was a direct invasion of
her inalienable right guaranteed to her by our Constitution, to pursue and obtain happiness.
Whether we call this a right of privacy or give it any other name is immaterial
because it is a right guaranteed by our Constitution that must not be ruthlessly and
needlessly invaded by others. We are of the opinion that the first cause of action of
appellant's complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
respondents.
Id. (emphasis added). This decision and others similar to it form a small minority of privacy
decisions. From these cases there evolved something akin to a " 'mores' test" on the part of
the judges, where liability attached "only for publicity given to those things which the
customs and ordinary views of the community will not tolerate." Prosser, supra note 17, at
397. Compare Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) with Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.
App. 285, 297 P. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931). See also Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala.
380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964) (woman who was photographed when jets of air blew dress above
herhead was granted relief); Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930)
(parents' petition to enjoin publication of photograph of their deformed newborn child stated
a cause of action).
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THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF PRIVACY

It was very early discerned that invasion of privacy was "not
one tort, but a complex of four," with each type of case having its
own applicable rules and standards. 36 These four categories are:
(1) "[a]ppropriation" of an individual's name or likeness for advertising purposes; (2) "[i]ntrusion" into the plaintiff's solitude or private
life; (3) "[p]ublic disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff"; and (4) "[p]ublicity which places the plaintiff in a false light
37
in the public eye."

Cases in the first category, concerning the appropriation of
one's name and likeness, appeared quite early. Consequently, this
38
group accounts for a significant part of the law of privacy.
Pavesich and Roberson are cases that fit within this category.
The second category, intrusion upon the plaintiff's solitude, is
typified by an early Michigan case in which the defendant had
intruded upon the plaintiff while she was giving birth. 39 Although
the precise ground was unexplained, the court allowed recovery.4 °
The scope of this tort has subsequently been expanded to include
searches without a warrant, 41 other illegal searches, 42 wiretapping,4 3 and eavesdropping.

44

The Warren-Brandeis article dealt primarily with the
third category of the tort, disclosure to the public of embarrassing
facts. 45 As the law has developed, in order to fit into this category,
it is necessary that the disclosure be: "a public disclosure, and not a
private one"; 46 "offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of
48
ordinary sensibilities"; 47 and of "private facts, and not public ones.
" Prosser, supra note 17, at 389.
37 Id.
31 W. PROSSER, THE LAw oF TORTS, § 117, at 805 (4th ed. 1971). See, e.g., Brociner v.
Radio Wire Television, Inc., 15 Misc. 2d 843, 183 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Spec. T. 1959); Young v.
Greneker Studios, Inc., 175 Misc. 1027, 26 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Spec. T. 1941).
" De May v. Rberts, 46 Mich. 160, 161, 9 N.W. 146, 146 (1881).
40 Id. at 166, 9 N.W. at 149.
" See, e.g., Young v. Western & A.R.R., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929).
42 See, e.g., Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett, 27 Ga. App. 365, 108 S.E. 309 (1921)
(intrusion into the plaintiff's hotel room); Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110
S.E.2d 716 (1959) (illegal search of shopping bag in store).
43 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931).
4 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810
(1939).
41 See generally Prosser, supra note 17, at 392-98.
46 Id. at 393. See, e.g., Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 11 (5th
Cir. 1962).
47 Prosser, supra note 17, at 396 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Samuel v. Curtis Pub. Co.,
122 F. Supp. 327, 328-29 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
4" Prosser, supra note 17, at 394. See, e.g., Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 337,
95 S.E.2d 606, 609 (1956).
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Cases in the last group, those concerning "publicity that places
the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye"-"false light" casesappear in various forms. One type "is that of publicity falsely
attributing to the plaintiff some opinion or utterance," such as a
"fictitious testimonial used in advertising. '4 9 More usual are articles or books containing ideas falsely attributed to the plaintiff.5"
Finally, there are those situations where the plaintiff's name,
photograph, or fingerprints appear in a "rogues' gallery" when he
has not been convicted of any crime. 5'
As a result of all of the aforementioned developments, the
right to privacy has become legally protected in 33 states and in the
District of Columbia. 52 Only four states have expressly refused to
53
award damages in a civil suit based upon that right.
PRIVACY,

LIBEL, AND NEWSWORTHINESS

Despite the efforts of many states to provide adequate
safeguards for the right to privacy, that right has generally been
considered subordinate to the right of the public to know and of
the press to publish. 54 Indeed, newsworthiness has invariably been
the most effective defense to privacy actions.5 5 Once a publisher or
19Prosser, supra note 17, at 398 (footnotes omitted) (citing Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905)).
10 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Ideal Pub. Corp., 210 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Spec. T. 1960). Another
example is the use of plaintiff's picture to illustrate a book or article with which he or she has
no reasonable connection. Cf. Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951); Gill
v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
51 See, e.g., Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905).
52 See D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 264-66 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PEMBER].

Four states have enacted privacy statutes. See N.Y. Civ. RJGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839-40 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-8 to -9
(1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650 (1957).
51 PEMBER, supra note 52, at 264-66.
51 For a historical development of press protection from the early 1900's to the present
and of the success of privacy litigants see PEMBER, supra note 52.
55 Id. at 161. "News" has been said to encompass
all events and items of information which are out of the ordinary humdrum
routine, and which have "that indefinable quality of information which arouses
public attention."
Prosser, supra note 17, at 412 (footnote omitted) (quoting from Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc.,
16 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1936)). This concept of newsworthiness has been applied to
a conglomeration of activities and events. See, e.g., Garner v. Triangle Pub., Inc., 97 F. Supp.
546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (article in detective story magazine sensationalizing plaintiff's subsequently reversed convictions for murder); Buzinski v. Do-All Co., 31 111. App. 2d 191, 175
N.E.2d 577 (1961) (picture in mechanical science magazine of plaintiffs likeness beside a
combination trailer car known as a "Land Yacht"); La Forge v. Fairchild Pub., Inc., 23 App.
Div. 2d 636, 257 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1965) (photographs of plaintiff published in an article
indicating clothes fashion at racetrack); Everett v. Carvel Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 734, 334
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member of the press has shown the material in question to be
newsworthy, the plaintiff can recover only if he proves "actual
malice." 5 6 To do so, it must be shown that the defendant knew the
material was false or that it was published "in reckless disregard of
the truth.

57

The application of the "actual malice" standard to actions for
invasion of privacy arose from the fact that the right to privacy has
long been interpreted and evaluated in much the same terms as are
applied to the law of defamation, specifically to libel. Likewise,
privacy standards have been imposed on defamation actions. 5
Especially in the category of privacy that is comprised of "false
light" cases, courts have found it more congenial to speak in terms
of defamation.5 9 However, it should be noted that there are fundamental differences between the two areas. While all libel cases
are concerned with publication of false matter,6" privacy cases
frequently involve no allegation of untruth.6 1 And while the primary harm being compensated in libel is injury to reputation, in
privacy the main damage is the mental distress one suffers by being
exposed to public view.6 2 Injury to reputation is no more than one
N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (photograph showing infant as 10,000th visitor to ice cream
manufacturer's tour). But see Gordon v. Random House, Inc., 486 F.2d 1356 (3d Cir. 1973),
vacated, 95 S. Ct. 27 (1974) (plaintiff shown as dishonest merchant in prologue of book);
Grove v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971)
(credit report concerning plaintiff supplied to agency subscribers).
56 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (citing New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
The actual malice standard was derived from the common law tort of defamation. See
Bromage v. Prosser, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (K.B. 1825). See generally Holdsworth, A Chapter of
Accidents in the Law of Libel, 57 L.Q. REV. 74 (1941). Defamation cases are concerned with
public disclosure of injurious matter, the primary harm being damage to reputation. Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217, 217 (1933). See
generally Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1904).
It was early established that truthful statements were fully protected at common law
even though they were defamatory and caused injury of the type libel laws were designed to
prevent. See Herald Pub. Co. v. Feltner, 158 Ky. 35, 39, 164 S.W. 370, 372 (1914); Lancaster v.
Hamburger, 70 Ohio St. 156, 164-65, 71 N.E. 289, 292 (1904). See generally Harnett &
Thornton, The Truth Hurts:A Critiqueof a Defense to Defamation, 35 VA. L. REV. 425 (1949); Ray,
Truth: A Defense to Libel, 16 MINN. L. REV. 43 (1931). It has also been accepted that not all false
statements could be penalized by the libel laws. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74
(1964).
5 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387 (1967).
58 See Wade, Defamationand the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093, 1120-25 (1962).
59 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (actual malice rule); Fouts v.
Fawcett Pub., Inc., 116 F. Supp. 535, 537 (D. Conn. 1953) (single publication rule).
60 See W. PROSSER, supra note 38, § 116.
6 Only "false light" cases necessarily involve allegations of falsity. For a description of
this category of privacy cases see notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
62 EMERSON. THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 551 (1970). This principle has
been stated somewhat differently:
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element bearing on such damage. Notwithstanding these differences, it was at one time anticipated that "the action for invasion of the right of privacy may come to supplant the action for
defamation ."63
One indication of the close relationship between the two areas
is the impact of the Supreme Court decision in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan6 4 on the right to privacy. An elected official in Alabama
brought a libel action against the New York Times and certain
individuals for an allegedly damaging advertisement that the
newspaper had published. 65 The Court allowed that the statement
involved could have been defamatory and the newspaper could
have been negligent in failing to check its accuracy.6 6 Nevertheless,
it reversed the Supreme Court of Alabama and the $500,000 jury
verdict.6" In doing so, the Court set forth standards to be applied in
libel cases against public officials for defamatory falsehoods concerning their official conduct. To recover, the plaintiff must offer
proof
that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with
knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether
68
it was false or not.

From New York Times and a series of subsequent cases, the
principle evolved that reports concerning public officials 6 9 and
public figures 70 were entitled to greater protection. However, these
Unlike libel which is made actionable because it humiliates or degrades a person
and injures him in the eyes of others, the invasion of the right of privacy is made
actionable because it outrages a person's own feelings and sensibilities.
Yankwich, Trends in the Law Affecting Media of Communication, 15 F.R.D. 291, 322 (1954)
(emphasis in original).
11 Wade, supra note 58, at 1121. It has also been suggested "that libel and the invasion
of privacy are aspects of the same wrong, both assaults on human dignity or worth."
Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court justice and the Philosopher, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 92 (1974).
64

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

Id. at 256.
66 Id. at 287-88.
65

11 Id. at 292.
66 Id. at 279-80.
69 In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Supreme Court expanded the New

York Times rule by applying the "actual malice" standard to actions arising out of criminal
prosecutions. In cases involving criticism of public officials, the Court rejected "the argument that criminal libel statutes serve interests distinct from those secured by civil libel laws."
Id. at 67.
Two years later the Court, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), broadened the
definition of " 'public official' " to encompass those "government employees who have, or
appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
government affairs." Id. at 85 (footnote omitted).
10 In Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Supreme Court determined
that the rule established in the New York Times case was applicable to those who were
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were all libel cases. The Court first considered the application of
the actual malice standard to an action based on the right to
privacy in Time, Inc. v. Hill.71 In 1952, James Hill and his family
were released unharmed after being held hostage in their home by
three escaped convicts.72 Thereafter, a novel was written depicting
a similar incident but amplifying the element of violence. The
novel was subsequently made into a play. Thereafter, a national
magazine, utilizing photographs of scenes staged in the former Hill
home, published an account of the play; describing it as a reenactment of the Hill incident. 73 The Court reversed the New York
court of appeals and held that, in an action for invasion of privacy,
erroneous statements about a matter of public interest are protected absent proof that the publisher knew of their falsity or acted
"in reckless disregard of the truth.

' 74

In reaching its conclusion, the Court found it necessary to
broaden the scope of first amendment protection to include reported events that were a matter of public interest, even though
such events concerned private individuals.7 5 The guarantee of a
free press counted for more than the right to privacy:
merely " 'public figures' "-that is, individuals "involved in issues in which the public has a
justified and important interest." Id. at 134. See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403
U.S. 29 (1971), where, by a three-man plurality, the protection of the New York Times
standard was extended to cases involving private individuals involved in newsworthy events.
The Court reconsidered the issue in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and
overruled Rosenbloom. For a discussion of these developments see notes 77-85 infra and
accompanying text.
71 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
72 Id.

at 378.

13 Id. at 377-78.
74 Id. at 387-88, 398. This standard was originally applied in libel actions. See note 56
supra and accompanying text. A substantial number of privacy actions deal with publicity
which places an individual in a false light in the public eye. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78
F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (article implying taxi drivers were dishonest); Russell v. Marboro
Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Spec. T. 1959) (altered photograph in objectionable
advertisement); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959) (allegations of theft upon
leaving store). Because this category of privacy has been evaluated in much the same terms as
defamation, there is a considerable overlap between the two types of actions. Wade, supra note
58, at 1120-25. For a discussion of the considerations concerning the assimilation of privacy
and defamation actions into a unitary concept see Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in
PRIVACY 182 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971). It was anticipated at one time that "the
action for invasion of the right of privacy may come to supplant the action for defamation."
Wade, supra note 58, at 1121. But see Kalven, supra note 21, at 328.
385 U.S. at 388-89. The Court observed:
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government.
One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range
of published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and
public officials. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant
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We create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable
service of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with
the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associated in news articles with a person's name, picture or portrait, particularly as related to non-defamatory matter.76
In light of Time, it would seem that the next logical step would
extend the protection of the actual malice standard to publishers
sued in libel by private persons whose names had appeared in
reports on matters of public interest. This was done by a threeJustice plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 7 7 However, that

decision was reconsidered three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. 7 Gertz arose out of the shooting of a black youth by a Chicago
policeman. The boy's family retained the plaintiff, Elmer Gertz,
to represent them in a civil action against the officer. 79 The defendant published American Opinion, a journal expressing the views of
the John Birch Society. The article complained of alleged that
testimony elicited at trial was false and that the suit was part of a
Communist plot aimed at the police.8 0 The Court acknowledged
that the article contained substantial inaccuracies and statements
ot lite in a civilized community. i he risk ot this exposure is an essential incident of
life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.
Id. at 388.
16 Id. at 389.
77 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The case involved a private individual who brought a libel action
against a radio station which repeatedly broadcast news of both his arrest for possession of
obscene literature and his subsequent suit for injunctive relief from police interference with
his business. Id. at 32-35. These reports used such terms as " 'smut literature racket' " to
describe the plaintiffs activities. Id. at 34. After a substantial jury verdict for the plaintiff, the
Third Circuit court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court sustained the reversal. Id.
at 32.
In an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined, Justice
Brennan asserted that the New York Times rule applied to "matters of public or general
concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous." Id. at
43-44 (footnote omitted). Justice Black, concurring, reaffirmed his position that the first
amendment precluded all libel judgments against the press. Id. at 57. justice White, also
concurring, considered the main subject of the reports to be the actions of the public officials
involved. As such, they were protected by the New York Times rule whether or not a private
party was incidentally involved. Id. at 61-62.
In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that in cases involving a private plaintiff, the states
should be able to define any standard of care except strict liability, and that actual damages
were a necessary prerequisite to a libel recovery, but that punitive damages are recoverable
where malice is proved. Id. at 64, 73. In a separate dissent, justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Stewart, agreed that in libels of private individuals the states should be left free to formulate
whatever fault standard was desired, except for absolute liability, but stated that recoverable
damages should be restricted to actual losses. Id. at 86-87.
78 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 139 (1974).
19 418 U.S. at 325.
80 Id. at 325-26.
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with no basis in fact and that the editor of the journal had made no
81
attempt to verify the charges levelled at the plaintiff.
In refusing to apply the actual malice standard to the facts, the
Gertz Court. found the differences between public and private
figures significant enough to justify different treatment under libel
law. 82 Public figures undertake
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. .

.

. [or]

thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
83 involved. In
either event, they invite attention and comment.
Private individuals, on the other hand, have no access to channels
of communication and lack the means of rebutting false statements.
In addition, extension of the New York Times test to private citizens
would encroach upon the legitimate interest a state has in protecting its citizens against defamation.8 4 Thus, the Court held that a
state could define its own standard of liability in such cases so long
85
as it was not liability without fault.
The impact of Gertz on the right to privacy is still in need of
clarification. One commentator has viewed it as restoring some of
86
the legal protection New York Times and Time had taken away.
81 Id. at 326-27.
82

Id. at 344-46.

83 Id. at 345. Although the Court acknowledged the possibility of one's becoming a

public figure' involuntarily, it considered that possibility to be remote. Id.
The Court found two means of determining whether one could be termed a "public
figure": (1) an individual could attain that status by "achiev[ing] such pervasive fame or
notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts"; and (2) a
person may become part of a public controversy, voluntarily or involuntarily, and thus be
considered "a public figure for a limited range of issues." Id. at 351.
84 Id. at 344-46.
85 Id. at 347. That the Court was able to overrule a case as recent as Rosenbloom was
due in large part to the fact that two justices significantly altered their views on the subject. Justice Blackmun, who had joined the three-justice plurality in Rosenbloom, stated that
in principle he still believed that the New York Times test applied to such a case, but was willing to change his vote inasmuch as it was needed to create a majority rule on the issue. Such
a "definitive ruling," Justice Blackmun felt, would dispel the ambiguities of Rosenbloom.
Id. at 354. ChiefJustice Burger, who had also been a member of the Rosenbloom plurality, was
of the opinion that the jury verdict in Gertz should have been reinstated. He offered no
rationale for this. Id. at 355.
88 Bloustein, supra note 63, at 92. Dr. Bloustein is of the opinion that the Gertz Court's
sanctioning any rule except absolute liability for cases of defamation of private individuals
involved in newsworthy events
rests on the identification of defamation as bearing a close relationship to the mass
publication invasion of privacy. Whether one agrees with the conclusion of the
Court in Gertz or not, the case displays a climate of sensitivity to privacy-related
issues and a vindication of privacy-related rights which is highly significant.
This observation leads one to question whether the [Time] case, were it to come
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That the Court may wish to reconsider its holding in Time was
intimated in a recent false light privacy case, Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co.1 7 Since the plaintiff had made no objection to the
trial court's "knowing-or-reckless-falsehood instruction 8 8 the Court
had
no occasion to consider whether a State may constitutionally
apply a more relaxed standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of false statements injurious to a private individual
under a false-light theory of invasion of privacy, or whether the
constitutional standard announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies
to all false-light cases.8 9

Taggart AND

ITS APPLICATION

In view of the broad strokes with which the Court has delineated the scope of the "newsworthiness" doctrine, the district
court in Taggart appears to have had a firm. basis for. granting
summary judgment to the defendants. Although the court acknowledged that Taggart was not a professional performer who -voluntarily made himself a participant in a newsworthy event9" and that
the segment of the film concerning plaintiff was not de minimis, 91
it nevertheless determined that the footage was -protected by the
first amendment. 9 2 The court further stated that Taggart was not
actually " 'diverted'" from his work and .''brought . . . upon the
before the Court today, would be decided as it was in 1967. The changed membership on the Court, and the emergence of what might be a new majority which
regards privacy with greater awareness of its constitutional significance, might well
dictate another result.
Id. at 93.
87 95 S. Ct. 465 (1974). Cantrell involved an action by a mother and son against a
newspaper publisher and two of its employees. The petitioners alleged an invasion of privacy
resulting from an admittedly inaccurate and partially fabricated article published by the
newspaper. The piece purported to portray the effects of the father's death in a bridge
collapse on the Cantrell family. Id. at 467-68. Because no question as to the standard of
liability to be applied was raised, tle only question confronting the Court was the correctness
of the court of appeals' action in setting aside the verdict. Id. at 469. Justice Stewart,
speaking for the Court, held that the evidence introduced relating to the "reckless" and
" 'calculated falsehoods' " which appeared in the newspaper was sufficient to uphold the
jury's verdict against respondents for compensatory damages. Id. at 470-71.
Dissenting, Justice Douglas adhered to his view that the press should be free from
attack. Id. at 471-72.
88 Id. at 469.
89 Id.
90

489 F.2d at 437.

91 Id.

91 Id. at 438.
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stage' "so as to separate him from his job. 93 Concluding that Taggart
was not deliberately drawn out as a performer for an intended effect
in the film, the district court granted defendants' motion for sum94
mary judgment.
The assumption implicit in the district court's decision-that
Taggart's mere presence at the Festival rendered him a participant
in a newsworthy event-was rejected by the Third Circuit. The
court reasoned that a material issue of fact existed and that the
district court acted improperly by choosing between Taggart's ver95
sion of the facts and that of the defendant.
Although the Woodstock Festival may have been a newsworthy
event, whether the plaintiff was in fact a participant or was instead
purposely drawn out as a performer was "at best a mixed question
of law and fact."' 96 The court explained that the grant of summary
judgment could be affirmed
only if we are prepared to hold that as a matter of law the
defendants are entitled to judgment even if Taggart was deliberately drawn out as a performer in a commercial film .... [Such a
ruling] would be predicated upon a more absolutist interpretation of the first amendment than
97 has yet been espoused by a
majority of the Supreme Court.
Based on this rationale, it would appear that the plaintiff need only
make a prima facie showing that he is "drawn out" in order to be
entitled to a trial. Conceivably, virtually every first amendment/
privacy case could therefore develop into a full-scale trial.
Other jurisdictions have avoided this possibility by formulating broad tests which simply determine whether the contested
segment evidenced a real relationship to the publication as a
whole. 98 In Buzinski v. Do-All Co., 99 for example, the defendants
63 Id. (quoting from the transcript of the district court). The district judge made the
following observations after viewing the film:
"I react . . . as the reasonable man might react after seeing the film.
I come to a different conclusion after having seen the film than I did from reading
just the dialogue. It was not so much a drawing out as to expose him to a substantial
participation in the film. The event fits in a pespective of moving from one aspect
of this festival to the next. He was not diverted from the work he was doing and
brought, so to speak, upon the stage and made somebody separate and apart from
the fellow who was working at the time they focused the camera on him. It is a very
difficult line to draw."
Id.
94 Id.
9 Id. For a discussion of procedural rules pertaining to summary judgment see text
accompanying notes 114-22 infra.
96 489 F.2d at 438.
97 Id.
9s See, e.g., Dallesandro v. Henry Holt & Co., 4 App. Div. 2d 470, 471, 166 N.Y.S.2d
805, 806 (1957).
" 31 Ill.
App. 2d 191, 175 N.E.2d 577 (1961).
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had published a photograph in which the plaintiff's picture was
included.'
The court, using a "reasonably related" test, held that
the plaintiff's presence in the photograph bore a sufficient relationship to its subject and that.no material issue of fact existed.' 0 '
The dissent in Taggart similarly perceived the issue of the
plaintiff's participation as a matter not requiring a jury's determination."0 2 Although it was not specifically stated, the dissent in
effect used a "reasonably related" test. Because the Woodstock
Festival was a newsworthy event and Taggart was "by his presence
there... a participant in it,"'10 3 the central issue to be decided by the
district court was whether the rule of Time applied to the situation. 104
100Id. at 192, 175 N.E.2d at 577-78.
1o Id. at 197, 175 N.E.2d at 580.
,02489 F.2d at 439 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 440.
114 Id. at 439. Judge Van Dusen would have affirmed on the ground that the district
court could have granted summary judgment on the issue of newsworthiness. Central to this
argument was the doctrine of "constitutional fact":
The question of whether or not Mr. Taggart was a participant in a newsworthy
event, even if properly characterized as one of fact, involves a constitutional decision as to the proper application of a First Amendment standard. It must, therefore,
be considered one of "constitutionalfact" which the Supreme Court has said to be subject to de
novo review.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
The dissent noted that in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the
Supreme Court had subjected the evidence of actual malice to de novo review. 489 F.2d at
439 & n. 1. See 376 U.S. at 285-86. In doing so, the Court stated:
This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we
must also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those principles
have been constitutionally applied. This is such a case, particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass across "the line between speech unconditionally
guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated." . .. We must "make an
independent examination of the whole record"... so as to assure ourselves that the judgment
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.
Id. at 285 (footnote & citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting from Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946), and Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,235 (1963)).
But although a finding of actual malice is clearly subject to de novo review, the
extension of that principle to the issue of newsworthiness presents a significantly different
issue. For if Judge Van Dusen was correct in applying the doctrine of constitutional fact to
newsworthiness, then serious questions are raised as to the protection of seventh amendment
rights. Stressing this point, the court in Taggart reasoned:
Disputes over "constitutional fact" are no exception to the seventh amendment....
Just as disputed facts in a nonjury case are determined by trial and not on summary
judgment motion, a trial judge's decision to instruct the'jury with the New York
Times standard or an appellate court's de novo review of "constitutional fact" are
both made after a full trial on the contested factual issues.
489 F.2d at 439 (citation omitted). See also Vandenhurg v. Newsweek, Inc., 441 F.2d 378,
379-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971). But cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75
(1966), where the Court stated:
[A]s is the case with questions of privilege generally, it is for the trial judge in the
first instance to determine whether the proofs show respondent to be a "public
official."
Id. at 88 (footnote omitted).
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The district judge in Grant could also have perceived that as
the only issue. That is precisely what the defendant contended,
citing the fact that the very same picture of Grant had appeared in
connection with an article of fashion in 1946.105 But the court
found that Time did not support the proposition that once a celebrity allows his picture to appear in a publication, its publisher can
claim perpetual permission to use the celebrity's likeness merely by
"referring to the original appearance as an 'event.' 106
Further, the court decided that the Time standard had no
application in a case such as the one before it where truth or falsity
was not in issue. 10 7 Therefore, a question of fact existed as to
whether Grant's photograph was used for the purposes of trade or
for some legitimate comment on a newsworthy event.10 5 In reaching that conclusion, the court found the "drawing out" test instructive, but expressed it somewhat differently:
[T]he First Amendment does not absolve movie companies-or
publishers-from the obligation of paying their help. They are
entitled to photograph newsworthy events, but they are not entitled.to convert unsuspecting citizens. into unpaid professional
actors..So here, 'defendant is-entitled to report.(either with or
without pictures). aimost any activity. in which Mr; Grant might
engage' It is not entitled to appropriate his services as a professional model. t0 9

It should be noted that Taggart, though not the "drawing out"
The most comprehensive study to date concerning the "constitutional fact" doctrine is
contained in L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
'05 367 F. Supp. at 883.
106 Id. at 884.
107 See id. at 883-84. The court noted that in Time, the Supreme Court had held that a
plaintiff could not avail himself of the same N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 51 (McKinney 1948)
"to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that
the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless
disregard of the truth."
367 F. Supp. at 883-84 (quoting from Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)). Thus,
the court in Grant could distinguish the facts before it since the plaintiff made no claim that
the Esquire article had published a false statement about him. 367 F. Supp. at 884.
108 367 F. Supp. at 880-81. It should be noted that neither party ever expected to go to
trial. The court recognized that the action was merely to determine the legal rights of the
parties and that a financial settlement would follow. Id. at 885.
09 Id. at 884. The court explicitly spelled out the message it had for a publisher:
(a) It must refrain from making under-the-table arrangements with actual or potential advertisers which would convert an apparent news story into a paid
advertisement; and if it can be established by competent evidence that the
publisher has not so refrained, it must respond in damages; and
(b) If the publisher feels impelled to trade upon the name and reputation of a
celebrity, it must pay the going rate for such benefit.
Id. at 883.
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test specifically, has had some impact on the law of libel. In Gordon
v. Random House, Inc.," 0 the plaintiff, who was of the Jewish faith,
sued the publisher for allegedly defamatory statements found in
the prologue of a book, The Negroes and the Jews.I" The Third
Circuit, in accord with Taggart, ruled that whether the plaintiff had
participated in a public controversy or had led "an obscure private
life" and whether any evidence existed of "reckless disregard" were
determinations to be made by the finder of fact.' 1 2 Resolution of
these issues was not possible without a full trial record. Only with
such a record could the district court "be in a position to strike the
proper balance between" the right to privacy and the first amend3
ment. 11
THE "DRAWING

OUT" TEST

The Taggart ruling, reserving the "drawing out" question for a
jury determination, is significant because it runs counter to the
general approach to summary judgment in first amendment cases.
It is well settled that summary judgment is rendered in civil cases
when there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and when
the moving party can show that, as a matter of law, it is entitled to
judgment." 4 Evidence is to be construed "in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."' 15 In cases dealing with first
amendment rights, however, the pattern has differed. The plaintiff in a privacy action, for example, must make a far more persua1 6
sive showing in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.'
It has been held that where a publication falls within the scope of
the newsworthiness doctrine, "summary judgment, rather than
trial on the merits, is a proper vehicle for affording constitutional
protection.""' 7 Concurring in Time, Justice Douglas provided a
reason for this:
110

486 F.2d 1356 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated, 95 S. Ct. 27 (1974).

III 486 F.2d at 1357.

2 d. at 1360-63. When the court decided Gordon, the Supreme Court had not decided

Gertz and thus the Gordon court was faced with the plurality opinion of Rosenbloom, which
extended the protection of the "actual malice" standard to reports on private citizens taking
part in newsworthy events. But the Gordon court refused to accept this as a "definitive statement" of the law. Id. at 1359. The court found more compelling the reliance the Taggart court
had placed on the trier of fact's assessment of the part the plaintiff had played in a "public
controversy." See id. at 1361.
113 Id.
14

F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.18, at 230-31 (1965).

15

United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam).

116 367 F. Supp. at 881.

117 Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1970).
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A trial is a chancy thing, no matter what safeguards are provided. To let a jury on this record return a verdict or not as it
chooses is to let First Amendment rights ride on capricious or
whimsical circumstances, for emotions and prejudices often do
carry the day.11

Generally, factual determinations in first amendment cases on
summary judgment motions evince a two-step process. Initially, the
trial judge decides whether the individual bringing suit was a
"public figure" or whether the activity in which the plaintiff was
involved was of "public interest."1 1 9 If the defendant meets this
initial "newsworthiness" test, then the second step is reached, requiring plaintiff to show that actual malice existed. t 20 If the plaintiff can offer no evidence as to actual malice, the judge will grant
defendant's motion for summary judgment;' 2' if sufficient evi1 22
dence is proffered, the case will go to trial.
The trial court in Taggart appeared to follow this procedure,
making an initial determination that Woodstock was a newsworthy
event and that plaintiff, as a participant, was therefore a public
the defenfigure. Because there was no evidence of actual malice,
23
dant's motion for summary judgment was granted.
385 U.S. at 402 (Douglas, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir. 1970); Time,
Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 572 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); United
Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706, 711-12 (9th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969). Cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966).
A private individual could become a public figure because of involvement in a newsworthy event. In Davis v. National Broadcasting Co., 320 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. La. 1970),
aff'd per curiam, 447 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1971), for example, the court held that
[a] person may become the subject of public interest within the meaning of [the New
York Times] rule, although he does not seek to be one, and indeed attempts to avoid
it. Thus, a person called to testify unwillingly before a grand jury, a bystander at an
event o] public importance, or the family of a public official may well be public figures
exposed to public comment that is protected by the privilege.
320 F. Supp. at 1073 (emphasis added).
120 See Buckley v. Esquire, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 1133, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). For a
discussion of actual malice see note 56 supra and accompanying text.
121 In Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 449
F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1971), on a motion for summary judgment in a libel action, the
court stated:
In order to prove actual malice, plaintiff must make an affirmative showing of facts
from which defendant's probable knowledge, of falsity may be constitutionally
sustained ....When it has been establishedas it has been in this case, that he cannot meet it,
the First Amendment makes it incumbent upon the Court to grant defendant's motion for
summary judgment.
302 F. Supp. at 1075-76 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
122 See Buckley v. Esquire, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 1133, 1134-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
12
See Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant at 48sa-49sa, Taggart v. Wadleigh-Maurice,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 937 (1974).
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The procedure applied by the Third Circuit in Taggart represents a departure from the two-step approach. The court did not
make an inquiry into the newsworthiness of the Woodstock Festival. It is inconceivable that the event would not be considered
newsworthy. Instead, it found the crucial question to be whether
the plaintiff was "drawn out as a performer in a commercial
film." 124

In effect, the "drawing out" test places an intermediate step in
the two-step process. It is no longer enough for a court to simply
decide whether a publication or film deals with a newsworthy
event. For even if newsworthiness is irrebuttable, the plaintiff will
still be entitled to a trial if he can show himself to have been drawn
out as a performer or exploited for commercial purposes.
In addition to affording privacy litigants an enhanced opportunity for trial, the test provides a means by which courts can judge
factual settings which do not fit nicely into one of the four
categories of privacy 25 and do not readily lend themselves to
solution through the actual malice test of Time. Taggart presents
such a situation. In applying the Time test, the dissent in Taggart
maintained that whether Taggart was drawn out was irrelevant.
This analysis is problematical because it is based on the assumption
that Time is the touchstone of all privacy actions. However, the
actual malice standard is borrowed from the law of libel. 126 And
falsity is an element of any libel action. False light cases would seem
to be the only privacy actions to which the test has application since
they are the only ones in which an allegation of falsity is requisite.1 27 Taggart's complaint contained no allegation of falsity. Indeed, it was the truth which the plaintiff objected to and which
provided the grounds for his contention that he suffered humiliation and mental anguish.
Thus, the "drawing out" test finds application in those instances where publishers capitalize on newsworthy events and
exploit individuals only incidentally connected with them. That
would occur in the course of news reporting if the photos or
124 489 F.2d at 438.
125 Taggart bears some resemblance only to cases in the third category, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra. Liability for
cases of this type is measured by a "mores" test. Recovery is allowed "'only for publicity given
to those things which the customs and ordinary views of the community will not tolerate."
Prosser, supra note 17, at 397. This standard is not an acceptable one for judging Taggart's
situation. He made no allegation that anyone would have found his predicament intolerable.
12 See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
127 See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
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statements are exaggerated, taken out of context, or used to hold
their subject up to ridicule.
Just as clearly, the test would have no application where the
plaintiff had consented to publication or had voluntarily placed
himself in the event. A case in point is another privacy action that
arose out of the Woodstock Festival, Man v. Warner Brothers, Inc. 128
The plaintiff, a professional musician, mounted a stage at the Festival
to play his flugelhorn. 1 29 His actions were filmed by a Wadleighsegment depicting them was
Maurice camera crew, and a 45-second
30
included in the documentary.'
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff had voluntarily "placed
himself in the spotlight" and thus had cast himself in the role of a
public figure. In any event, the inclusion of the segment in the film
31
was de minimis.1
The Taggart court had no difficulty distinguishing Man. Taggart did not have 400,000 spectators watching his performance. In
addition, the critical acclaim that attended Taggart's appearance
precluded an entry of summary judgment on the ground that the
1 32
segment was de minimis.
CONCLUSION

The decision of the Third Circuit in Taggart has afforded the
plaintiff in a privacy action the procedural rights due any litigant
in a civil action. Where there existed a disputed issue of fact' 33 or a
question of credibility, 34 the courts have held that a trial was called
for and that the granting of summary judgment was error. 35 In
addition, the "[r]esponsibility for resolving doubtful issues of fact
rests upon the jury." 136 In reversing the district court, the court of
appeals simply placed first amendment privacy actions within the
same procedural framework as other civil actions. As the ruling in
Taggart implies, to allow a trial court on a motion for summary
128

317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The plaintiff instituted a diversity action seeking

injunctive relief under N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1948). 317 F. Supp. at 51.
The text of section 51 is set out in note 4 supra.
129 317 F. Supp. at 51.

130Id. at 53.
131 Id.

132 489 F.2d at 437.

133See, e.g., United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam).
131See, e.g., Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949).
135 Id.
136Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Kirtley, 307 F.2d 418, 422 (8th Cir. 1962).
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judgment to determine that the case of one party is more credibie
than that of the other-w here it is admittedly " 'a very difficult line
to draw' "1 3 7 -is

to invade the province of the jury. 138 This trend

has been checked by this decision.
While the Third Circuit did not delve into the substantive issue
of whether there was an invasion of privacy, its determination
affects both first amendment rights and the right to privacy. The
"drawing out" test can be used as a gauge to determine whether or
not a material issue of fact exists. This test has a two-fold effect on
privacy actions that might be made subject to the Time rule. The
immediate effect is to permit the plaintiff, upon a sufficient showing of his being drawn out, to appear before the trier of fact, thus
making a determination of newsworthiness by the district court
unnecessary. The second and more significant consequence is that,
if the plaintiff succeeds in proving that he was drawn out, the
defendant loses the first amendment protection of newsworthiness, and the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of proving actual
malice.

139

Although the emphasis on a full trial subjects the rights of the
press to an added chill, 140 the court said that it is "de minimis when
compared with the unsatisfactory alternative of ruling on a potentially serious conflict between legally protected rights without a
complete record."141

By formulating an exception to the Time rule and affording
privacy litigants more opportunity for a full trial, the courts by
implication have given more weight to the right to privacy. This
right has not only been recognized by the Supreme Court as
protected by the Constitution, 142 but has been said to be "the most
137

489 F.2d at 438 (quoting from the transcript of the district court).

' See 489 F.2d at 439. To the dissent's argument that the "constitutional fact" doctrine

allows the district court to resolve issues of fact on a motion for summary judgment, the court
answered: "Disputes over 'constitutional fact' are no exception to the seventh amendment." Id.
See note 104 supra.

This result has been viewed as inevitable in an era, like the present, which emphasizes
the necessity of "balancing" interests. In 1968 it was predicted:
[Tihe Court is very likely to find itself "in trouble" if the doctrine of "constitutional
fact" is to continue to persist .... [I]t may be necessary for the Court to work out
modifications in the "constitutional fact" doctrine for those types of cases where
there may be lesser degrees of danger in allowing greater leeway to fact determinations below.
Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of Constitutional Fact, 46 N.C.L. REv. 223, 282-83 (1968).
13 For a discussion of the problem of applying actual malice in privacy cases see text
accompanying notes 125-27 supra.
140 See notes 116-18 supra and accompanying text.
489 F.2d at 438.
142 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." 14 3 Given the growing importance of this right, a proper
balance need be struck between it and first amendment rights
when they are in conflict. Taggart set the stage for the striking of
that balance. Since Taggart, the decisions in Gordon and Grant have
helped to delineate and establish guidelines for the resolution of
144
conflict between "these two essential and fundamental values.'
Taggart, at the very least, has served as a catalyst for the reassessment of traditional approaches to these issues.
Diana L. Armenakis
Emerson has suggested the establishment of a constitutional right to privacy. He has
proposed that
[t]he scope of that right would be determined by what was necessary to maintain an
effective system of privacy, a guarantee of that "sphere of space" essential to the
integrity and freedom of the individual.
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 562 (1970).
1'3Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
144 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

